Last week we discussed the state of democracy in Turkey and a few possible reasons for that form of government's relative stickiness in that country. Admittedly, the picture was a muddy one. This week's discussion, in which we look a little more deeply at Turkey's ongoing efforts to join the European Union, will bring a little more clarity to that picture. The two subjects - accession and democracy - are intertwined and dynamic, especially with respect to Turkey's economic and human rights record. In many instances, the requirement of EU member states on Turkey have spurred the democratic process in Turkey, but lingering demands among many in the EU ask Turkey to go back in the other direction.

Globalization is a difficult process, for both the globalizers and the globalizees, and like most things, it can be both good and bad. But when it works as a tool to raise living standards, improve relations between countries, and encourage the recognition of a broader set of human liberties, it is a positive force in the world. Almost by definition. As Human Rights Watch has noted, the process of preparing its bid for EU membership has helped Turkey consolidate and deepen the progress it has made in the field of human rights. Further, its changes in economic policy have raised living standards and made everyday economic life more predictable for many people.

But there is a long way to go. If you walk down the right street in the city of Istanbul, you can get a three course, sit-down meal for a shade under four dollars. If you walk down the wrong street (or the right one, depending on whom you ask) you'll have to drop twelve dollars for a can of soda. The point is not that in some parts of the city they are better at fleecing tourists than others; the point is that even among the catering to tourists set of establishments, wholly different economies exist within the city. In order for it to be a success, Europe's relationship with Turkey must alleviate this dichotomy, not expand it.

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Let's start with the basics: why would Turkey want to join the EU, anyway? As it turns out, a straight answer to this question isn't as easy to come by as one would think. Especially among the European and American press, the benefits to Turkey have been more assumed than discussed: obviously the Turks want to join our club, why wouldn't they? As such, most coverage of accession discussions has focused on whether or not the EU would benefit from Turkey's presence.

For a long time, a large majority of the Turkish population agreed with them. A poll conducted by A&G Research in 2004 found that 67.5% of Turks surveyed favored accession to the EU. Likewise, English-language press coverage in Turkey focused mostly on convincing Europeans, not Turks, that an EU/Turkey alliance would be a good idea.

However, a more recent poll, also conducted by A&G, showed only 57.4 % support for accession among Turks. Nefise Bazoğlu noted in a recent editorial that this decline reflects more subtle thinking among the general Turkish population about the country's economic future. Whereas a Euro-centric economic outlook (in which increased EU/Turkish trade, labor mobility and diplomatic goodwill would outweigh the costs of reduced subsidies to Turkish textile operations and some farmers) drove earlier opinions, a more global outlook is starting to settle in among the country's business class. As Bazoğlu notes, the globe's rising economic stars are Asian, not European, and as such it makes sense for Turkey's economic plans to focus there. A more intelligent growth plan would include (not focus on) Europe, while developing significant relations with Turkey's immediate neighbors in the Middle East as well as Asia and Africa.

As with any partnership, both sides have to come out of the deal better for having done it. While most Turks still realize the economic and social benefits to their country as being real, Europeans have an emphatically negative outlook on the potential of Turkey as a member of the European Union. Fifty-two percent of Europeans oppose Turkey's membership bid while only 35% support it. Regional opposition runs significantly higher in some places: in Austria (where, not coincidentally, the word "Turk" is a derogatory term referring to non-white immigrants) close to three quarters of the population oppose Turkish membership in the EU.

Europeans site a litany of reasons in opposing Turkey's bid, varying from the weak, capricious and incorrect (Turkey is poor and not geographically in Europe) to the cliched (job losses) to the legitimate (ongoing human rights abuse and a sometimes-faltering democracy). However, many recognize the benefits of Turkish membership in the EU, including the potential to fill Europe's impending demographic gap, the country's growing economy and the geopolitical effect a wealthier, economically-integrated Turkey might have on its neighbors.

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Economic arguments against Turkey's entrance into the EU are weak. Reforms in Turkey have reduced inflation from 70% in 2001 to below 8% today. Economic growth has averaged close to 10% over the last three years. Because inflation is disproportionately damaging to low wage earners, these economic changes have occurred in a way that begins to alleviate the two-economy problem in Turkey and have come with matching improvements in health and social security measures. Accession into the EU could further help the progress by raising wage standards and encouraging foreign investment. Finally, both Ankara and Brussels believe that over the long term, Turkey's economy will contribute significantly to Union coffers.

The majority of actions cited by Europeans and Americans as Turkish human rights violations have occurred in the southeastern part of the country, where the country's Kurdish minority lives. Though the country has made significant progress in this area -- the rash of disappearances, killings, and torture that occurred during the 1990's have all but stopped -- European concerns remain legitimate. Turkey must address Kurdish displacement, recognize the Armenian genocide, and completely end torture of political prisoners (not to mention having political prisoners in the first place).

Yet this whole picture gets more complicated when you consider other human rights demands placed upon the Turkish government, especially those related to women's rights. The Kurds who are the most frequent subject of government-inflicted violence are strong adherents to a lifestyle that houses men and women in separate living areas, prevents girls from attending school and holds women in an inferior social position. Combine this fact with Europe's concern over the rising influence of Islam in Turkish secular government and its discomfort with the Turkish military's historical role in protecting the secular constitution, leave the Turkish central government in a difficult position.

These demands ask Turkey to simultaneously suppress people and allow them to make their own decisions. Ironically, this debate has had something of the same effect on governments of the Union, where national legislatures, especially those on the continent, are ignoring the stated opinion of the electorate in begging accession discussions.

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We all do bad things. Every country. And democracy comes and goes everywhere. But the fact that some of us are already part of the club allows us to ignore those things. Just as we might learn a thing or two from Turkey's experience in building a multi-ethnic democracy in a majority Islamic country, the United States might also learn from Turkish efforts at self-examination.

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